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I. INTRODUCTION
Past predictions of substantial hazardous waste litigation in
our federal courts involving Superfund' sites are becoming real-
ity. Of the 988 proposed and final sites that the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has designated for inclu-
t United States Magistrate, United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, Camden, New Jersey, since 1983. B.S.E. Princeton University,
1971; J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1976. The author served as
the designated settlement judge in each of the New Jersey cases mentioned.
1. Superfund is a name for the statutory scheme created under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
§§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA], as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SARA]. In a typical
Superfund case, the federal and/or state governmental plaintiffs may seek recov-
ery of costs of removal or remedial action, other necessary response costs, dam-
ages for injury to natural resources, and health assessment costs [hereinafter
remedial costs] from potentially responsible persons in connection with a facility
such as a landfill containing hazardous substances, pursuant to section 107(a) of
CERCLA. The responsible persons may be the owners or operators of the facil-
ity, the generators which arranged for disposal of hazardous wastes, and the
transporters taking such hazardous substances for disposal to the facility.
(111)
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sion in the National Priorities List,2 many are in litigation, or are
in the administrative process leading to the record of decision
that will become an element of remediation litigation in which bil-
lions of dollars are at stake.
The "multi-party hazardous waste" cases discussed here are
those actions brought by governmental authorities, usually under
the Supeffund statute, seeking to remedy the problems of past
disposal of hazardous wastes at landfills or other sites. Some-
times the conduct at issue occurred years or even decades ago,
and records may be missing or non-existent. Such cases are
"multi-party" because of the usual joinder of the many parties
believed to be responsible for the ownership or operation of the
facility, or those believed to have generated the wastes or trans-
ported them to the site. Such litigation may seek to enforce the
government's remedial plan for abatement of the release or sub-
stantial threat of release of hazardous substances, either through
injunctive relief against responsible parties under section 104 of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCIA),3 or through collecting the
response costs for actions taken to remedy the problem consis-
tent with section 107(a) of CERCLA.4 The latter type of case-
called a "cost recovery" action-provides the context of our pres-
ent discussion and presents the most challenging and complex is-
sues for case management and settlement processes.
The burdens that traditional adversarial litigation place upon
the governmental plaintiffs, the potentially responsible person
(PRP) defendants, and the courts themselves can hardly be over-
stated. In the District of New Jersey alone, more than a dozen
major multi-party Superfund site cases have been filed, involving
from two dozen to over 600 parties. Several of these cases in our
court in Camden have been. amicably resolved wholly5 or in large
part,6 or the ranks of the PRPs have been thinned by a settlement
2. EPA National Priorities List, 40 C.F.R. Part 300, App. B at 121 (1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
4. Id. § 9607(a).
5. See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688
F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), denied motion 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983). In this
case before Judge Stanley S. Brotman, a settlement fund of $17.2 million plus
interest was created among all 50 parties in 1987, providing for the remediation
of the landfill ranked sixth on the National Priorities List. EPA National Priori-
ties List, supra note 2. Settlement issues included the proposed remedial plan,
its projected costs, the allocated share for each participant, and the extent of
settlement reopeners and covenants as required by SARA.
6. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Management
Servs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.J. 1989) [hereinafter GEMS Landfill]. This
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with de minimis parties, 7 using court-supervised settlement meth-
ods similar to those discussed in this article.
The creation of fair alternatives to trial-centered litigation
has become imperative in these cases. Without an alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism, the multi-party case becomes a cha-
otic, expensive, and inefficient effort. Multiple independent
waves of discovery requests lead to redundant discovery without
assuring creation of an overall database. Efforts to join new par-
ties become fragmented, and pleadings, including cross-claims
and counterclaims, multiply exponentially. Motion practice
quickly becomes an exercise in tedium, beginning with service of
motion papers upon perhaps hundreds of other parties or coun-
sel, and receipt of multiple submissions in opposition, to assure
that all have been "heard." Similar recurrent issues emerge with-
out prospect for addressing them efficiently. The trial itself, even
if limited to an issue such as allocating past and future remedial
costs among PRPs, extends for many months as each party partic-
ipates in the gymnasium-sized trial.8 The process leading to ami-
cable resolution is likewise fragmented, as no party wishes to
thrust itself forward at the risk of being perceived as weak on the
merits of its case. It goes without saying that the transaction costs
for such an uncoordinated undertaking-measured by attorneys'
fees, delay and uncertainty-become enormous. The dollars
spent in the process of reaching a final judgment may well out-
strip the underlying costs of remediation and future operation
case is also before Judge Brotman. For a concise description of the GEMS Land-
fill litigation and the Phase I settlement process raising $32.5 million for a rem-
edy performed by the settling PRPs, see Florio, Andrews, Fario, Jr. & Tambussi,
Too-Strict Liability: Making Local Government Entities Pay for Waste Disposal Site
Cleanup, 1 VILL. ENrrL. L.J. 105, 109-17 (1990). The GEMS Landfill ranks
twelfth on the National Priorities List. EPA National Priorities List, supra note 2.
7. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1989). In
this case, Chief Judge John F. Gerry reviewed and approved the proposed de
minimis settlement decree between the United States, the State of NewJersey and
ten parties believed to have minimal exposure, pursuant to section 122(g) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 2 2(g), at the Lipari Landfill, which is the site ranked
first on the National Priorities List. EPA National Priorities List, supra note 2.
The de minimis settlement decree required the settlors to pay a total of approxi-
mately $3.03 million, out of the total estimated costs of site remediation pro-
jected at $65.27 million in 1989, subject to various negotiated reopener
provisions. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 670-72.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H.
1985), and 694 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded
in part, 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990), in which the non-jury trial consumed almost
19 months on the first phase (finding liability to perform cleanup or pay costs, or
both), and over five additional months in the second phase (determining the
costs to be borne by each of 15 responsible parties). 900 F.2d at 431.
1991]
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and maintenance of the Superfund site if such litigation is
uncontrolled.
These cases, in short, place new demands upon the profes-
sionalism and skills of counsel while calling upon the courts for
creative judicial management and leadership to overcome these
pitfalls of complex litigation. Within the litigation process-the
most formalized dispute resolution technique-lies the capacity
for an efficient, crisp, judicially-supervised alternative dispute res-
olution process. The seeming paradox of creating a settlement
vehicle from within the formalized litigation process is not hard to
comprehend if the ingredients for a fair negotiated settlement are
understood and incorporated into the pretrial process. This arti-
cle seeks to identify the ingredients of a fair dispute resolution
process within the management of multi-party Superfund site
cases. ,
The court (through the District Judge, the Magistrate, or
both)9 is in a position to coordinate case management in a man-
ner designed to foster deliberate attempts by the parties to nego-
tiate the settlement of the case, while minimizing transaction
costs, delays and uncertainties. The notion that a case benefits
from consistent and thoughtful judicial intervention is not new.
The cries of litigants for greater judicial involvement in case man-
agement have led to the 1983 amendments to Rules 16 and 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to pretrial man-
agement conferences and control of discovery abuse, respec-
tively. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
rewritten to require early scheduling conferences and pretrial
conferences in most civil cases, while affording broad latitude to
the judge to enlarge upon these procedures for complex cases.' 0
9. References herein to "judge" will mean the District Judge or the Magis-
trate to whom case management responsibilities have been delegated. Congress
has recently changed the title of United States Magistrate to "Magistrate Judge."
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089,
- (1990). In the District of New Jersey, most civil case management functions
and settlement processes are performed by the Magistrate Judges, preparatory
to the dispositive motion practice or trials before the District Judges. See Gen-
eral Rule 40A, U. S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.
10. The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules noted the increasing neces-
sity for judicial involvement:
Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at
an early stage to assure judicial control over a case and to schedule
dates for completion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the
case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less
cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983) (citation omitted). Thus,
Rule 16 empowers the court to enter scheduling orders and other case manage-
4
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Likewise, Rule 26(b) calls upon the court to curb overuse of dis-
covery by identifying the litigation activities that are proportion-
ate to the nature of the case, the amount involved or the issues or
values at stake; Rule 26(f) invokes judicial supervision of a suita-
ble program of discovery through discovery conferences; and
Rule 26(g) places an affirmative duty upon counsel to act respon-
sibly in demanding and supplying pretrial discovery.'I
Further, the Manual for Complex Litigation (MCL 2d)12 remains
a valuable source of suggestions for the judicial management of
complex cases. Although the MCL 2d does not have specific sug-
gestions for multi-party hazardous waste cases, and although its
rather begrudging tone' 3 on the use of Magistrates for pretrial
management of complex cases is outdated in many districts,' 4 it
does contain many proven ideas for streamlining case manage-
ment that are equally applicable to these cases.
Most recently, Congress has enacted the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990,15 which principally addresses compulsory judicial in-
volvement in the case management processes. Title I of the Act is
concerned with redressing the problems of excessive costs and
delay, 16 and it calls upon the district courts to formulate "civil
justice expense and delay reduction plans"' 7 for effectuating
ment orders, with or without convening conferences, beginning within 120 days
of the filing of the complaint and extending up through the time of trial. Id.
The court has power to enforce its case management orders by appropriate
sanctions pursuant to Rules 16(f) and 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
11. The Advisory Committee here noted the following:
The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discov-
ery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always op-
erate on a self-regulating basis....
The court may act on motion, or its own initiative. It is entirely
appropriate to resort to the amended rule in conjunction with a discov-
ery conference under Rule 26(f) or one of the other pretrial confer-
ences authorized by the rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1983) (citations omitted).
12. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter MCL 2d].
13. Compare MCL 2d § 20.14 (suggesting that judicial supervision be exer-
cised by trial judge in complex cases) with id. § 23.12 (suggesting appointment of
another judge or magistrate to coordinate settlement negotiations).
14. See, e.g., C. E. Smith, UNrrED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 99-101 (1990); C. Seron, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUD-
IES 25-46 (1985).
15. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-
805, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482) (Title I of
this Act embodies the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 103(a) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 471).
1991]
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closer judicial supervision. Significantly, the Civil Justice Reform
Act embraces the concepts that judicial case management can
lead to the swift and fair resolution of cases,' and that the judi-
cial officer must explore alternatives to trial that may resolve the
case. 19
Utilizing these statutory and procedural tools, the judge can
do much to foster an environment for settlement negotiations. It
is not only possible but, in my view, desirable to apply the bene-
fits of judicial case management to the creation of the settlement
process within the litigation. Court-supervised settlement
processes are also not a startling development. Among the sub-
jects to be discussed at pretrial conferences, according to Rule
16(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are "the possibil-
ity of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute." The judicially-supervised settlement process may
be designed to promote the opportunity for judicial participation
directly in negotiations or to lead to "extrajudicial procedures,"
as both alternatives are contemplated by Rule 16(c)(7). Further,
Rule 16(c)(10) authorizes adoption of "special procedures" for
complex cases.
The degree of judicial involvement in the settlement process
has been the subject of debate over the years. 20 Key criticisms of
18. Id. § 103(a) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 473).
19. Judicial Improvements Act § 103(a) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 473).
This provision states that the court shall consider implementation of a district
plan addressing the following principles for complex cases:
(3) for all cases that the court or an individual judicial officer deter-
mines are complex and any other appropriate cases, careful and delib-
erate monitoring through a discovery-case management conference or
a series of such conferences at which the presiding judicial officer -
(A) explores the parties' receptivity to, and the propriety of, set-
tlement or proceeding with the litigation;
(B) identifies or formulates the principal issues in contention
and, in appropriate cases, provides for the staged resolution or bi-
furcation of issues for trial consistent with Rule 42(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure;
(C) prepares a discovery schedule and plan consistent with any
presumptive time limits that a district court may set for the comple-
tion of discovery and with any procedures a district court may de-
velop to -
(i) identify and limit the volume of discovery available to
avoid unnecessary or unduly burdensome or expensive discov-
ery; and
(ii) phase discovery into two or more stages....
Id.
20. These concerns were summarized in MCL 2d as follows:
Neither the bench nor the bar agrees on the role a trial judge
should play in bringing about a settlement. The temperament, style,
6
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judicial participation are that the trial judge could prejudge the
case by information learned in informal negotiations, and that the
attorneys may feel forced to reach agreement in order to avoid
the judge's "wrath." 21
Several common practices, followed in our district as a rou-
tine matter, address these concerns. First, the trial judge usually
delegates judicial supervision of day-to-day settlement discus-
sions to the magistrate.22 If a settlement is not concluded, the
trial judge can reach the merits of the case on a clean slate at trial.
Second, information that may be used in the multi-party settle-
ment negotiation will typically be of high quality, screened and
analyzed by proponents and opponents alike. This database itself
is the product of careful pretrial discovery, and fears that settle-
ment negotiations will infect the truth-finding process are thus
unfounded. If the case reaches trial, the discussion and evalua-
tion of this information in the settlement effort will enhance the
and philosophy of the individual judge are important factors, as is the
nature of the case. Some judges do little more than suggest the general
desirability of settlement and see that the case moves steadily towards
trial. Others take an active part in leading settlement discussions,
pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the respective positions of
the parties, presenting additional considerations and alternative forms
for compromise, meeting separately with the parties if all consent, and
even recommending specific terms of settlement. Some ask or require
that a representative of each party with settlement authority attend the
discussions; others prefer to conduct settlement conferences with only
counsel present. Many judges limit their settlement activities to jury
cases; others believe that they can, without jeopardizing their impartial-
ity in fact or appearance, take an active role in non-jury cases as well.
Some are active from the outset of the litigation, while others prefer to
wait until later in the proceedings or until the time of trial....
Id. § 23.11 (footnote omitted).
21. Compare Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 426-31 (1982)
(recognizing threat to impartiality accompanying judicial participation in pretrial
stage) with Brazil, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETrTLEMENT 44-45 & 418-425
(1988) (recognizing preference that trial judge not be directly involved in settle-
ment negotiations in non-jury cases).
22. Such delegation to the magistrate is consistent with the suggestion of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which commented as to Rule 16(c)(7) as
follows:
It is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) [sic] to impose settlement negoti-
ations on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral fo-
rum for discussing the subject might foster it .... For instance, ajudge
to whom a case has been assigned may arrange, on his own motion or
at a party's request, to have settlement conferences handled by another
member of the court or by a magistrate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note (1983) (citations omitted).
As a practical matter, the magistrate can usually devote more time to the
daily aspects of such an intense process, while the district judge conducts hear-
ings and trials that cannot afford the interruptions.
1991]
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quality of the trial evidence. Finally, litigants' fears of incurring
the displeasure of the court or clients if settlement efforts are un-
successful may well motivate parties to work harder to achieve
settlement, which can be productive if the supervising judge has
not actually cultivated such fears.28 The acknowledgement that
any judicial system, including supervised negotiations, can be
abused in extreme cases by judges or litigants, does not suggest
that such a process should not be created. The potential for
abuse suggests instead that the supervising judge must be vigilant
and work within a pre-arranged framework for settlement confer-
ences and negotiations. Any judicial conduct suggesting that
non-settling parties will receive less than a fair trial would be
improper.2 4
II. INGREDIENTS ENHANCING THE PROSPECT OF
SUCCESSFUL MULTI-PARTY HAZARDOUS WASTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The creation of the court-supervised settlement process
seems to require certain understandings between the court and
litigants, and among the parties themselves. If there is no consen-
sus that negotiations may be worthwhile, and if parties do not
agree to be forthcoming with information and to participate in
good faith, the settlement process is jeopardized at its outset.
While the particular features of multi-party hazardous waste case
settlement processes will be as varied as the underlying cases, sev-
eral ingredients would seem to enhance the prospect of a success-
ful outcome.
Overall, these elements may be grouped into four areas of
concern: (A) agreeing to seek to agree-defining the process
within a good faith compact; (B) organization through liaison
counsel and timing of negotiations; (C) assembly of a database
23. Indeed, judicial measures viewed by participating counsel as coercive
"will be resented and are rarely productive." MCL 2d § 23.11.
24. The observations regarding limitations upon the judicial role in super-
vising settlement negotiations set forth in MCL 2d § 23.11, are well taken:
Judicial involvement in settlement discussions, however extensive,
must not be permitted to affect the perception of the parties that the
judge will be fair and objective, both at trial if negotiations fail and in
passing on the merits of the settlement if, as in class actions, it must be
submitted to the court for approval. Although the court may aid settle-
ment discussions by indicating its current views on some issue, it
should never distort those views for strategic effect and should give the
same information to all parties.
8
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concerning the litigants, the landfill, and each litigant's relative
connection to it; and (D) analysis and negotiation of settlement
positions. Each area will be discussed and illustrated with exam-
ples involving typical Superfund litigation issues. Finally, a sam-
ple "Case Management Order for Settlement Purposes" appears
as an Appendix to further illustrate the pre-settlement mecha-
nisms that the judge can put into place.
A. Agreeing to Seek to Agree-Defining the Process within a
Good Faith Compact
The settlement process is, at its heart, consensual. The court
cannot do more than provide a forum and enforce the rules of
negotiation that the participants have agreed to.
The first step occurs at a case management conference, when
the subject of a settlement process first emerges. Such discus-
sions are appropriate if it appears that the timing for settlement
negotiations is correct and that the underlying data for informed
settlement discussions has been obtained or can be obtained,
through tightly-managed pretrial discovery procedures, and that
the requisite parties have been joined in the case, as discussed
further below. The conference gives counsel the opportunity to
discuss whether various issues are ripe for negotiations. Whether
it is possible to negotiate a "global" settlement, a "partial" settle-
ment, or a settlement of only "de minimis" parties, will depend on
the varying circumstances of the case. Obviously, the more well
developed the remedial plan has become, and the more inclusive
the list of PRPs joined in the litigation, the more realistic it be-
comes to consider a "global" settlement.
If the remediation of the landfill has proceeded in stages, a
partial settlement as to past remediation may be achievable.
Where the governmental plaintiff's proposed choice of remedy
has received approval through summary judgment motion prac-
tice, or where the defendant PRPs have determined not to contest
the proposed remedy itself, the settlement negotiations will logi-
cally focus upon remaining issues such as past and future costs
and the allocation of such liability among the PRPs.
At earlier stages of the proposed remedial process, it may
still be possible for the PRPs to significantly negotiate and affect
the choice of remedy, allowing the issue of "remedy" itself to be-
come a topic of negotiation. 25
25. For example, in the pretrial phase of United States v. Price litigation, the
plaintiffs and defendants participating in settlement discussions agreed that the
1991]
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If a consensus emerges that the time is ripe to launch settle-
ment negotiations upon some or all issues, the court next asks
those parties wishing to participate in settlement negotiations in
good faith to identify themselves. This is accomplished through
an order requiring each party to choose whether or not it wishes
to participate in the settlement negotiations. An appropriate
form of order appears in the "Case Management Order for Settle-
ment Process," Appendix A below.
The phrase "participate in good faith in settlement negotia-
tions" in paragraph one of the order connotes an affirmative
promise to be a participant, that is, to engage in dialogue in the
settlement negotiations. "Good faith" participation also antici-
pates that the party will be forthcoming with all information rea-
sonably needed for informed negotiations and that the party, by
agreeing to participate, will not use negotiations as an artifice or
tool of delay.
As the form in paragraph one of the sample "Case Manage-
ment Order for Settlement Process" makes clear, the party pledg-
ing to negotiate in good faith is not deemed to thereby bind itself
to agree to any settlement or to any allocated share. The party, of
course, may withdraw its agreement to participate in the settle-
ment negotiations upon written notice to all liaison counsel, 26
provided that such notice is served prior to agreeing to the settle-
ment. Naturally, a party cannot freely withdraw from a settlement
agreement once it has given final assent.
When the completed forms are returned to liaison counsel
for each group, and liaison counsel render their reports to the
court, the list of the participants (or "potential settlors") is
complete. 27
first topic of negotiation would be the selection of remedy itself. Price, 523 F.
Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), denied motion 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983). This followed logically from the fact that the court
had trifurcated the case, so that the issue of remedy would have been the first
issue tried, followed by liability and ultimately apportionment of costs. It
proved exceedingly difficult to negotiate between the two competing remedial
proposals put forward by the United States and the multi-party defense group.
Ultimately, the government's proposed remedy was adopted within the settle-
ment, funded by the defense group.
26. See infra note 30, for a discussion of the term "liaison counsel."
27. A similar process was used in the GEMS Landfill case, except that all
counsel were required to come to the courthouse on September 15, 1988, to
execute the form at a case management conference. GEMS Landfill, 719 F. Supp.
325. When it became clear that several hundred attorneys were appearing for
that special conference, the venue was shifted to the largest available courtroom.
Even so, there was not sufficient room and counsel were literally sitting on win-
dow sills and spilling into the hallway. This otherwise insignificant detail is men-
10
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss1/5
RESOLVING MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION
For parties deciding not to participate in the settlement ne-
gotiations, their positions are preserved. The court must choose
whether to manage the case at this point on two tracks, a settle-
ment track and a litigation track, or whether to defer the litigation
and other pretrial preparation pending either the completion or
the discontinuance of settlement efforts. 28 Just as the rights of
the non-settlors are preserved, so too are the settling parties'
rights to seek contribution or indemnification from non-settlors
preserved for a subsequent trial, if necessary.
B. Organization Through Liaison Counsel and Timing of
Negotiations
Although the settlement decree, if negotiations are success-
ful, will amount to an agreement among the participating parties,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct multilateral ne-
gotiations among all participants, in the first instance. Instead,
the multiple parties are grouped into appropriate functional units
for purposes of preliminary negotiation. These units are the "li-
aison groups" or "defense groups" that have presumably been
established at an earlier stage of the litigation.29 The court may
tioned only because it became clear to anyone attending that special conference
that the trial of the GEMS Landfill case, if it were to involve several hundred
active litigants, was practically unthinkable and that settlement efforts had to be
pursued. Most parties appearing that day signed the form, the lists were pub-
lished, and the settlement negotiations unfolded with intensity throughout the
next four months, leading to a settlement of the first major phase of remediation
efforts.
28. The MCL 2d, suggests that a general stay of discovery and pretrial pro-
ceedings, or a postponement of trial, pending settlement negotiations, should
rarely be granted. MCL 2d § 23.13. Multi-party hazardous waste litigation may
present such an exception to the no-stay rule. The length of the settlement pro-
cess is not easily controllable. Coordination among dozens, if not hundreds, of
adverse parties, decisionmaking by administrative agencies includingJustice De-
partment officials in Superfund settlements, resolution of collateral disputes re-
garding insurance coverage, expanding knowledge of the landfill site and of the
roles of the PRPs, can consume large blocks of time despite everybody's diligent
efforts. A supervisory judge refusing to stay such litigation pending settlement
negotiations may be creating the pressure of a firm trial date while depriving the
participants of another strong settlement incentive, namely, avoidance of sub-
stantial pretrial transaction costs. If there is a palpable sense that the process of
negotiations will be lengthy but probably successful, it would make good sense
to temporarily stay pretrial preparation, reassessing the stay at a later date if
settlement progress is unsatisfactory. It is well to impose a reasonable timeline
upon the parties, however, to avoid settlement drift and negotiation hang-ups
on relatively minor points. A series of deadlines for accomplishing each settle-
ment stage serves well to keep the process on course.
29. For example, the liaison groups in a CERCLA section 107 case involv-
ing multiple parties may include the governmental plaintiff(s), the alleged
owner/operators of the site (CERCLA § 101(20)), the alleged generators which
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also wish to give thought to creating or recognizing sub-groups
whose interests may collectively diverge for settlement purposes
from the existing group.
While recognizing that the settlement process may proceed
most smoothly if the initial negotiations are conducted through
group representatives, the identity of the representative and the
degree of authority reposed in the representative by the group
members should be the product of group deliberation and choice.
The settlement participants in each group should be afforded the
opportunity to consider whether they wish to use their existing
liaison counsel30 as the settlement representative, or whether they
wish to choose a new settlement liaison counsel whose roles and
duties would be confined to the group's settlement processes.
Similarly, the group members will have the opportunity to decide
whether their group settlement representative has the capacity to
bind any group members, or whether the representative's author-
ity is more circumscribed to being a "go-between" in negotiations
with other groups and chairperson of the group's internal settle-
ment processes. Because ultimately the group must have confi-
dence in the representative3 l and in the process, it seems most
produced hazardous substances allegedly disposed of at the site, the alleged
transporters which moved hazardous substances to the site (CERCLA
§ 101(26)), and the Municipalities which allegedly disposed of hazardous sub-
stances in municipal waste at the site, or any other functional grouping of parties
alleged to be potentially responsible persons for release of hazardous substances
and sharing common characteristics. Creation of a "municipalities" group, in
this example, recognizes a category of litigants that may technically be genera-
tors or transporters, but which share common issues and circumstances with one
another more than with the standard group members.
30. "Liaison counsel" are the attorneys designated to coordinate activities
and communications of a group in complex litigation. The liaison counsel con-
cept is flexible to best meet the needs of each case. Each group or sub-group
generally selects its own liaison counsel, and the functions of liaison counsel are
designated by the court after consultation with the affected parties. The term is
described in MCL 2d as follows:
LIAISON COUNSEL is a term generally used to describe attorneys whose
primary duties for the group involve essentially administrative matters,
such as communications with other counsel and the court. Typically
they receive various notices, orders, motions, and briefs on behalf of
the group, and then make appropriate distributions within the group.
They may initiate and convene meetings of the group, give notice of
and report on major developments in the case, and otherwise aid in
coordinating activities and positions. Such counsel may act for the
group in managing document depositories and in resolving scheduling
conflicts. An attorney with offices in the same locality as the court is
usually selected as liaison counsel.
MCL 2d § 20.221.
31. The negotiation of settlement in a multi-party hazardous waste case, as
in any complex litigation, is dependent in large part upon the chemistry between
12
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appropriate that the group members decide by consensus who the
individual representatives are and what their powers will be, sub-
ject to court approval.
A procedure for the selection of settlement liaison counsel
and establishment of their roles is set forth in paragraph two of
the sample "Case Management Order for Settlement Process,"
Appendix A below.
The settlement liaison counsel will then be the attorneys who
assemble and analyze the settlement-related data and who meet
most frequently with each other and the court. Especially in the
early stages of negotiations, when issues are being discussed that
transcend individual parties, it becomes important to paint with a
broader brush to avoid being bogged down in individual parties'
concerns. This can be done by limiting the early phase of settle-
ment negotiations among the groups to just the settlement liaison
counsel. At a later time, when individual concerns start to
emerge within the general settlement context, other negotiators
are naturally brought into the process.
At the same time as the court-supervised negotiations are be-
ing conducted, of course, the negotiations within each group also
go forward. The group meets at a distance from the courthouse,
and in practice it is seldom necessary for the supervising judge to
become involved in individual party negotiations within the
group.
Settlement liaison counsel should be compensated for their
efforts by all participants who benefit from their services. As sug-
gested in MCL 2d, "the terms and procedures for payment should
be established by agreement among counsel. If a consensus can-
not be reached, however, the judge has the power and duty to
order fair reimbursement and compensation." 32 By providing for
an agreement before substantial services are rendered, the issue
of fair compensation need never come before the court.
The court can also seek a consensus among the participants
concerning the timing of settlement negotiations. In settlement
litigants, which in turn depends upon the temperaments and skills of the settle-
ment liaison counsel. Such counsel "should not be selected or approved by the
court to serve in these positions unless they have the resources, the commit-
ment, and the ability to accomplish the assigned tasks. They should be able to
command the respect of their colleagues and work cooperatively with opposing
counsel and the court." Id. § 20.224. The ideal settlement liaison counsel
would possess demonstrated skills of a mediator, marriage counselor, civil engi-
neer, economist, clairvoyant, diplomat and, finally, litigator.
32. Id. § 20.223 (citations omitted).
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discussions, as in many areas of litigation, "timing is everything."
At too early a stage, the parties are uninformed of the facts upon
which a fair settlement can be based; at too late a stage, the par-
ties may feel they have little to lose by going to trial.
Coordination of the settlement process with the administra-
tive proceedings before either the EPA or the relevant state envi-
ronmental agency must also be achieved. Where federal and state
agencies are both involved in the site, inter-governmental coordi-
nation of settlement positions must also occur. Usually, multi-
party hazardous waste litigation exists concurrently with some
stage of an administrative remediation process. For example, the
United States may be seeking past response costs under section
107(a) of CERCLA, 33 with respect to a completed early phase of
remediation at the same time that the EPA is conducting the re-
medial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) leading to a rec-
ord of decision on a final phase of remediation. In this example,
whether it may be more productive to seek to resolve only the
past response costs, or to seek a complete settlement of future
liability as well, requires a sensitive judgment. The settlement li-
aison counsel, always including the attorneys for the governmen-
tal plaintiff(s), are in the best position to advise the court on this
question of timing. In this example, the "global" approach to set-
tlement may be desirable in the sense that nothing "drives" a set-
tlement like finality; when a participant knows that it can resolve
the entire case against it, it is in a position to achieve a final peace
through a single negotiated payment. On the other hand, in this
example, if the RI/FS has not been completed, and if no alterna-
tive design has been proposed by the PRPs for the final phase, it
may be unproductive to seek to resolve anything other than the
past remediation and response cost issues, while awaiting future
phase developments.
It may also be possible to coordinate the administrative and
judicial processes in a multi-phase remedial program. In the ex-
ample above, where the later-stage remediation is still being stud-
ied and designed, the court may wish to conduct the settlement
process in phases. The resolution of the past response cost is-
sues, because they are more concrete, may appropriately be the
first phase of negotiations. When such agreements have been
reached, the parties can then turn to the overall resolution of the
case, including the ongoing and future remedy issues. Agree-
ments upon the "known" issues may lead to agreements upon fu-
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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ture "unknown" issues. In any event, the process should
accommodate a common-sense acknowledgement of the ongoing
administrative agency processes and the real-world actions taken
or contemplated by the governmental plaintiff at the landfill.
Finally, the participating PRPs may choose to organize and
fund the design of an alternative remedial plan. Such engineer-
ing studies and design efforts can be coordinated through the set-
tlement liaison counsel. Funds for the study are raised by the
self-assessment of the participating groups including each of the
members who stand to gain from the study and design efforts. It
is not inconceivable that a hybrid remedial plan could emerge
from the settlement process, taking the best characteristics of the
competing plans of the government and of the participating
PRPs. In the best of settlement worlds, the final settlement may
embrace a remedial plan having greater efficiency than either of
the "competing" plans. This settlement effort can result in a bet-
ter cleanup and a lower cost than might otherwise occur. The
likelihood of such an outcome can be enhanced by the reasonable
sharing of information and direct discussions between the various
engineering experts for the government and PRPs, as discussed
further below.
In short, it is important to select settlement liaison counsel
who are knowledgeable, experienced and respected by group
members. The issues to be part of the settlement discussions
should be identified at the outset, especially if less than the entire
case is to be resolved. The participants should clearly delineate
the authority of their selected settlement representative, through
whom all inter-group negotiations will take place and who should
generally have authority to convene intra-group meetings of par-
ticipants. The participants should agree up front to an equitable
sharing of settlement liaison counsel's fees. The timing of the
phase or phases of negotiations should emerge from the consen-
sus of the representatives, within deadlines imposed by the court,
and negotiations upon the larger issues should go forward, super-
vised by the court.
C. Joining Necessary Parties and Assembly of Database
Concerning the Litigants, the Landfill, and Each
Litigant's Nexus to the Landfill
A major ingredient in a multi-party hazardous waste litiga-
tion settlement process is the assembly of a "critical mass" of po-
tentially responsible parties willing to undertake a settlement. It
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is recognized that the governmental plaintiff does not always
choose to name each potentially responsible person as a direct
defendant, nor is it obligated to do so. As a consequence, how-
ever, settlement participants may seek to join absent PRPs as par-
ties in the litigation, to increase the number of active parties.
Since the settlement process becomes most viable when most par-
ties believed to have a substantial connection to the landfill have
been joined, it may be desirable to assure the prompt joinder of
such parties before settlement negotiations are underway.
The court can create a window for joinder of additional par-
ties, granting leave to the governmental plaintiff and/or the ex-
isting defendants to file an amended complaint or third-party
complaint, as the case may be, within a fixed deadline. The iden-
tification of additional parties has presumably been an early ob-
jective in the regular management of the complex case. If not
already done, however, the beginning of the settlement process
presents a sensible opportunity for the amendment of pleadings
to join new parties.
In the settlement process, as in the litigation generally, the
court should not encourage the joinder of insignificant parties.
The creation of the "critical mass" should not depend upon the
addition of parties of dubious liability or doubtful connection to
the landfill. The court has discretion to condition amendment of
pleadings accordingly. While granting a "window" of opportu-
nity to join additional parties, such leave to amend may be accom-
panied by a reminder of counsel's obligations under Rule 1 1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3 4 pertaining to a good faith
basis for thejoinder. Leave may be further conditioned upon the
self-discipline of the liaison counsel in exercise of their discretion.
Counsel may be urged to join only the parties thought to have a
34. Rule 11 requires, among other things, that the signature of an attorney
upon a pleading:
[Clonstitutes a certification by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
The Rule 11 obligation thus anticipates that new parties will not be joined
without first completing reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts. This re-
quirement is underscored by the need for the initiating party to later serve the
new party with "a statement of the complete present evidential basis for the
inclusion of that defendant or third-party defendant," as part of the court-or-
dered common discovery, discussed below.
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substantial connection who are still viable. An appropriate order
permitting such promptjoinder appears in paragraph three of the
sample "Case Management Order for Settlement Process," Ap-
pendix A below.
The proposed order also cures potential conflicts in thejoin-
der of new parties by permitting a defendant to opt out of the
third-party complaint, so that it would not be regarded as a third-
party plaintiff as to some or all of the new third-party defendants.
This mechanism can be used to avoid situations where, for exam-
ple, a generator defendant would otherwise be perceived as join-
ing another generator as third-party defendant, creating an
adverseness that could be detrimental to the common settlement
efforts within the generator group. This procedure anticipates
that there will be some coordination among the defense groups
and that the appropriate pleadings would emerge. This proce-
dure, like any other litigation short-cut, calls upon the profession-
alism of the attorneys. The alternative, however, is a fragmented
motion practice instituted by various plaintiffs and defendants,
each seeking to join new parties, identical or not, resulting in a
paper-chase that literally complies with the rules but unduly com-
plicates the proceedings.
This procedure for speedy joinder of new parties also re-
quires service of the new pleading to take place promptly (within
thirty days of filing), accompanied by the summons, the previous
pleadings in the case, and copies of all case management orders,
including the case management order for settlement process.
The shortened time for such service is justifiable because the
existence and whereabouts of each of the new parties has presum-
ably already been confirmed through records discovery. The new
parties should not be hard to find, as they are all believed to be
viable and to have a substantial connection to the landfill after the
"reasonable inquiry" required by Rule 11. Service of the case
management orders will bring the new parties up to date on the
unfolding litigation and settlement processes.
There are many ways to assemble a reliable database for set-
tlement purposes. The most formal mechanism would rely upon
the exchange of interrogatories, document production requests
and the conduct of depositions, followed by expert witness re-
ports under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. By taking advantage of the case management
opportunities, the court can facilitate the speedy and efficient as-
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sembly of reliable discovery information from all settlement
participants.
Settlement liaison counsel can assist the court in identifying
the type of information that should be obtained from each party
and about the landfill. Such information will probably include the
following:
1. The administrative record of actions taken to date
before the administrative agency or agencies.
2. A summary of reasons why plaintiff has joined each
defendant.
3. A summary of reasons why each third-party defend-
ant has been joined.
4. Studies undertaken by any party regarding the land-
fill, including investigations obtained during the liti-
gation by coordinated efforts, such as split-sampling
or joint experts.
5. All transportation and landfill records from which a
waste-in list can be compiled, showing the type of
substances and volume disposed of at the landfill,
and identifying each responsible person disposing of
such substances.
6. Documents from each party reflecting hazardous
substances allegedly shipped to the landfill.
7. Documents reflecting the waste-disposal practices of
each party concerning hazardous substances.
8. Other information tending to establish or to dis-
prove a nexus of hazardous materials between the
PRP and the landfill.
To be sure, the above list resembles most of the information
that would be obtained in plenary discovery absent a settlement
process. The supervising judge must reconcile the conflict be-
tween the need for a full but costly fact-gathering and the desire
for a less costly and more efficient, but also less complete, discov-
ery process in aid of settlement negotiations. In a case where the
settlement process comes toward the end of full formal discovery,
one would expect that relatively less additional information would
be needed to "complete the picture" for meaningful negotiations.
In such a case, the process must assure that all parties have met
their reasonable discovery duties, so that recalcitrant parties are
not rewarded at the expense of those that have been more forth-
coming with discovery information.
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In a case where the settlement process occurs at an early
time, before most parties have engaged in formal discovery, the
opportunity for focusing discovery and saving transaction costs is
greatest. In my experience, the quickest way to obtain a uniform
database for settlement purposes is through court-ordered com-
mon interrogatories and document production requests, with
depositions available only from those parties that are unwilling or
unable to provide responsive answers. Standardized interrogato-
ries and document production requests are proposed by liaison
counsel, or by a special committee of counsel, for the court's ap-
proval. These common requests are themselves the product of
some negotiation. Disputes as to the form or scope of the inter-
rogatories or document production requests are resolved by the
court. When these written discovery requests have been submit-
ted by liaison counsel and approved by the court, an order is en-
tered to compel each party to serve responsive answers and to
arrange for the production of responsive documents.
The advantages of court-approved common discovery re-
quests should be obvious. First, the negotiated drafting and ini-
tial court approval eliminates later quibbling about the scope or
relevance of the information requested. Second, all participants
know that they need only supply responsive answers to these dis-
covery requests, and that further discovery will not generally be
required of them within the settlement process. Third, the com-
pulsion of a court order assures compliance by litigants. Fourth,
the certification of discovery responses under oath, as required by
Rules 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, en-
hances reliability. Fifth, common requests lead to a common
database that can be analyzed and arrayed in computer-assisted
format; this analytical aid extends not only to the numerical data,
but also to the important relationships between the PRPs.
An example of an order requiring answers to such interroga-
tories and document requests appears in paragraph four of the
sample Case Management Order for Settlement Process, in Ap-
pendix A below. The process described in paragraph four pro-
vides for two-way discovery, first from the party who joined the
PRP, whether the initiating party was a plaintiff or defendant, and
then from the newly joined party. In this example, there are four
short sets of common interrogatories and document requests,
each serving a separate but related function. The process starts,
as indicated, by requiring the party which is the first party to file
and serve a claim upon a defendant or a third-party defendant, to
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provide that defendant or third-party defendant with "a state-
ment of the complete present evidential basis for the inclusion of
that defendant or third-party defendant" by serving answers to
the first uniform discovery set. After such service, the second ex-
change involves the joined party automatically answering the sec-
ond common set of discovery, providing "a statement of its
complete presently known information concerning issues of
quantity and quality of material and the nexus of that material to
the Site," as required in the second set. The third common dis-
covery set in this example involves the interrogatories and docu-
ment production requests that may be used by the plaintiff to
obtain from any defendant or third-party defendant further infor-
mation concerning quantity, quality and nexus. When the plain-
tiff makes such a request, it is obligated to provide reply
information to that party by answering the fourth set of common
discovery requests, which generally seek any additional informa-
tion in the governmental plaintiff's possession, concerning that
party's nexus to the landfill.
In this example, depositions are generally not permitted as
part of the court-ordered discovery process in aid of settlement
negotiations. An exception may be necessary concerning infor-
mation not necessarily reflected in documents-such as the meth-
ods of operating the landfill. Depositions are costly and highly
variable in the quality of information gained. Where a party is
unable or unwilling to answer the written discovery within the
court-imposed deadlines, however, depositions can be ordered
and the costs and counsel fees associated with those depositions
can be awarded as a discovery sanction against the recalcitrant
party for breach of the discovery order, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The interrogatory answers and the documents produced in
response to the common requests are not served upon all liti-
gants. To achieve greater efficiency, they need only be served
upon the parties directly involved and liaison counsel. The liai-
son counsel maintain the document repositories for their group.
Group members have access to the information in the repository,
and arrangements are made with liaison counsel for inspection
and duplication. Consultants working with settlement liaison
counsel can analyze the data and put it into a useful format for
settlement negotiation purposes. Even in a complex case with no
prior discovery, there is no reason to believe that it should take
more than four months to draft and propound and answer this
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court-ordered discovery which serves as a basis for settlement ne-
gotiations. In the event that settlement negotiations are unsuc-
cessful, of course, this discovery would complete an important
first phase of plenary discovery, setting the stage for depositions.
Another element of data necessary for such settlement nego-
tiations involves insurance discovery. Discovery of a party's liabil-
ity insurance information is permitted pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though insurance
carriers should not be joined as parties in the multi-party hazard-
ous waste cases, insurance disputes between PRPs and their insur-
ance carriers concerning alleged coverage are a recurring reality.
By gathering information about such insurance coverage and dis-
putes in a common discovery set, such coverage issues can be
identified and insurance coverage limits can be explored.
An example of court-ordered insurance discovery is set forth
in the fifth paragraph of the sample "Case Management Order for
Settlement Process," Appendix A below. In this example, every
party other than the governmental plaintiff shall provide this in-
surance information, and the settlement liaison counsel are
obliged to identify any group member which has not timely sup-
plied the information. In practice, it has proved difficult to as-
semble this insurance discovery. Where landfill operations
occurred several decades ago, it may not be possible to retrieve
complete information in so short a time. On the other hand, de-
fendant PRPs seem increasingly attuned to the need to explore
their comprehensive general liability insurance policies that may
provide coverage for the conduct at issue.
At a later stage of settlement negotiations it may be advisable
to invite representatives of the insurance carriers for individual
parties into the process to attempt to resolve coverage disputes
while pursuing the opportunity for the insured's settlement of the
underlying litigation. As a practical matter, however, it may not
be possible for a court-supervised settlement process to address
the nuances of each party's insurance coverage dispute. Presuma-
bly, the insured and the insurer are engaged in collateral cover-
age litigation and they may wish to avail themselves of that
dispute resolution process either before or after the insured's ac-
tual share of the proposed settlement is known. It can benefit
both the defendant PRP and its insurer, however, who make their
peace while the party still has an opportunity to conclude the pro-
posed settlement. The possibility for resolving the insurance cov-
erage dispute is enhanced by knowledge of the insured's
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proposed individual settlement share. The savings of transaction
costs in the underlying litigation, as well as in the insurance cov-
erage suit that would otherwise go forward, can bridge what
would otherwise be substantial monetary gaps.
The court supervised settlement process can also be
designed to promote the informal exchange of views between the
experts or consultants retained by the opposing parties. The top-
ics of such dialogue can involve the proposed remedial design,
the on-site and off-site degradation, ground water monitoring
and modeling, projected remedial costs, and projected operations
and maintenance costs for the remedial action. Such informal
discovery can be promoted through the procedure in the sixth
paragraph of the sample "Case Management Order for Settle-
ment Process," Appendix A below.
The experts conduct informal dialogue at a distance from the
courthouse, and even settlement liaison counsel may be excluded
from some or all of the meetings. Candid discussions between
experts in aid of settlement negotiations can emerge from an en-
vironment protected by an appropriate confidentiality order, ne-
gotiated among settlement liaison counsel and approved by the
court.
An example of an order providing for confidentiality of set-
tlement discussions appears in the seventh paragraph of the sam-
ple "Case Management Order for Settlement Process," Appendix
A below. When the "critical mass" of parties has been assembled
and a comprehensive and reliable database has been obtained,
the participants are in position to actually negotiate upon the set-
tlement issues.
D. Analysis and Negotiation of Settlement Positions
The approaches that can be taken to the actual negotiation of
the settlement are as varied as the issues to be addressed and the
circumstances in which the parties find themselves. One hesitates
to generalize in this area, and a few suggestions follow. A logical
first step is to determine which issues are not in dispute. Is there
general acceptance of the remedial plan? Has a reasonably firm
nexus to the landfill been established for each participant and
group? Is there agreement about the hazardous nature of the
substances discharged by each party at the landfill? Is there
agreement about the landfill's characteristics, including the de-
gree of harm both on-site and off-site?
It would be a rare case to find substantial agreement among
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all participants on most of these issues. The nature and character
of the data may not permit such easy stipulations that could result
in the preparation of the comprehensive waste-in list of hazard-
ous substances by each PRP. More often, data are incomplete,
genuine disputes exist as to the quantity and hazardous quality of
the substances discharged, and disputes may still exist regarding
even a party's connection to the landfill.
Putting aside such individual party concerns for a moment,
the next logical step may be to seek agreement about the overall
contours of settlement of each large issue. What is the most likely
total cost of past and future responses consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan? Should a "premium" be required to be
paid for early settlement to insure against risk of overruns?
Which substances, if any, have proved to be the most detrimental
to the landfill in terms of remediation costs and is any party or
group most responsible? Should there be negotiated reopeners
to the overall settlement in the event that actual response costs
fall below or above a specified range? What steps should be taken
to preserve settlors' rights of contribution against non-settlors?
Other questions present themselves, depending upon the circum-
stances of the case. By working from the general issues to the
specific, the negotiators may be able to reach tentative working
hypotheses concerning the overall settlement criteria.
A third level of negotiation may involve the respective shares
of the settlement to be borne by the various groups. At this
point, the submission of confidential settlement brochures by set-
tlement liaison counsel may prove to be beneficial. If there can
be an equitable settlement proposing the relative portions of the
total to be raised by each group, then the apportionment of indi-
vidual shares within each group can be considered. There is no
set formula for deciding upon a fair settlement share for the own-
ers/operators, the transporters, the generators, the municipali-
ties, and any other groups. As with any settlement, such shares
will presumably take into account the statutory liabilities created
for each such group, the relative strength of the evidence, the risk
of non-settlement, the ability to pay (or, stated conversely, the
degree of indifference to an adverse judgment), and other appro-
priate factors.
The supervising judge can provide a forum for these discus-
sions and inject suggestions for consideration of the negotiators
when appropriate. Such negotiations can present immensely
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complicated issues of fact and law, and the supervising judge
should not venture suggestions carelessly.
The fourth level of specificity of negotiations will be the indi-
vidual settlement shares of each participant. As the number of
such participants increases, so does the desirability of engaging
an outside, independent dispute resolution mechanism. The in-
dependent analyst can quickly process the data, receive the par-
ties' positions and comments, mediate competing positions, and
suggest a settlement "grid" based upon appropriate factors. Ex-
cellent private dispute resolution firms exist, and some public en-
tities are also seeing the wisdom of providing such services.3 5
Again, no simple formula suggests what these ultimate allo-
cations should be. Settlement schemes can logically apportion
such liability in accordance with volumetric measures, adjusted or
not for the degree of toxicity, enhanced for the highly toxic and
diminished for the borderline situation. Alternatively, partici-
pants can be placed into broad tiers of minimal, moderate and
enhanced amounts. Another logical method is to examine the
waste streams comprised of specific groupings of generators and
the transporters that connect them to the landfill, allowing for ad-
justments to this allocation based upon the existence of, for ex-
ample, indemnification agreements and other contractual waste
disposal relationships.
The selection of the ultimate allocation mechanism becomes
a sensitive economic issue, as well as a political decision within
the settlement process. The settlement rationale must not only
be fair, but it must be perceived as fair by the participants. This
does not mean that an individual participant needs to be
overjoyed by the result. It means that participants should gener-
ally be able to point to substantially similarly situated parties and
see that there are not gross disparities in the settlement shares.
The settlement liaison counsel must also be sensitive in their ne-
gotiation of the ultimate allocation mechanism to avoid using this
opportunity to confer a benefit upon a private client through se-
lection of an unfair allocation scheme.
This can be a time-consuming, computer-intense process. It
is therefore more likely to be fit for the outside dispute resolution
mechanism than for multilateral negotiation before the judge.
35. For example, in New Jersey, the Center for Public Dispute Resolution
has been created within the Department of the Public Advocate. The Center
provides a mediation process which can be annexed to the litigation as an alter-
native dispute resolution mechanism at low cost and high effectiveness.
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The settlement judge can more productively review, upon request
of the participants, any seemingly gross disparities that may have
emerged in the proposed settlement grid.3 6
The next level of concern, as previously mentioned, arises
when the individual party's proposed share is known. Whether
the payment of that share will come from the party, the party's
insurance carrier, or a combination of both may require resolu-
tion of insurance-related disputes. Deadline pressures to achieve
the overall settlement do not normally permit individualized judi-
cial attention to single-party insurance disputes. The disputants
may decide to resolve their claims, or that the insured or insurer
may "front" the settlement payment, preserving all rights for sub-
sequent insurance coverage litigation.
When it becomes clear that sufficient money has been raised
among the participants to fund the bulk of the proposed settle-
ment, and that settlement is therefore highly likely, a new settle-
ment dynamic emerges. Parties that may have been lukewarm
participants or concerned about some minor aspect of the propo-
sal become justifiably concerned that the case will be resolved
without them. The consequences and risks of such non-participa-
tion can be great enough to supply the final impetus for agree-
ment by undecided participants.
The drafting of the consent decree in conformity with the ap-
plicable statutes and regulations can be assigned to a drafting
committee of counsel. Such drafting can be a tedious task, espe-
cially as to the non-economic issues. Again, the settlement judge
can help with suggestions of language if the drafters are unable to
agree. Finally, each participant votes whether to accept the settle-
ment and, if it accepts, it submits its signature page to settlement
liaison counsel within the court-established deadline. The lodg-
ing of the decree for public comment, and ultimately for the con-
36. A similar procedure was followed at this stage of the United States v. Price
settlement process. The settlement participants agreed upon a private dispute-
resolution firm to help the group achieve its internal allocations. The firm's fees
were paid by a special assessment upon the participants. When the private pro-
cess was concluded (it took about 60 days), a special subcommittee of counsel,
nicknamed the "Gang of Four," worked with settlement participants who be-
lieved their final proposed allocation shares to be unfair. The settlement judge
also met with these participants, in the presence of "Gang of Four" attorneys, to
discuss and review their specific allocations within the overall settlement. Spe-
cial hardships were also considered at that point. The end result of this lengthy
series of meetings was a proposed settlement decree in which most parties prob-
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sideration of the trial judge, completes the settlement negotiation
process.
III. CONCLUSION
The judicial process-the most formal of dispute resolution
mechanisms--can also become a tedious and ineffective mecha-
nism in multi-party hazardous waste cases. The judicial forum,
however, can also give rise to a settlement process characterized
by enhanced judicial supervision, flexible and responsive design,
good faith elective participation of parties, streamlined discovery,
and negotiation by committees of counsel selected by the parties.
This model recognizes that case management directed explicitly
at settlement efforts employs judicial tools which are distinct from
ordinary pretrial management, yet consistent with the recent
amendments to Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, MCL 2d, and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.
Necessity generates solutions to complex Superfund litiga-
tion. The incentives for creative bench-bar settlement programs
have become obvious. The court, faced with the prospect of
barely manageable litigation, including lengthy multi-phase trials
and appeals, is spurred to expend the extra thought and effort for
supervision of settlement. Governmental plaintiffs enjoy the
prospects of quick recoupment of public funds, resolution of the
Superfund site remedy or recovery action, and conservation of
enforcement resources, which face the demands of almost one
thousand National Priorities List sites, making exploration of set-
tlement options desirable. For the PRPs, a successful settlement
process virtually eliminates risks of litigation and substantially
reduces transaction costs of discovery, motion practice, trial, and
appeal.
Elements for a fair Superfund settlement process, as dis-
cussed above, include provisions for consensual creation of the
settlement rules, such as those concerning good faith information
sharing and bargaining. Under court supervision, the partici-
pants identify themselves and take a role, along with governmen-
tal plaintiffs, in defining the objectives of the process and the
means for achieving agreement. Participants organize themselves
into settlement groups and choose representatives for the overall
negotiations.
The topics and timing for negotiation efforts will depend
upon the stage of litigation, the status of related administrative
proceedings, and the degree of self-organization among the
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PRPs. Court-supervised processes are flexible enough to encom-
pass settlements by de minimis parties, settlements of partial
phases of site remediation, allocation of past and/or future pro-
jected remedial costs, funding of the proposed governmental
remedy, or funding of a partial or total remedy to be performed
by the PRPs. Agreement may first occur on an overall funding
goal, subject to allocation among individual participants. The
non-monetary terms of settlement are also the product of negoti-
ations, within Superfund's statutory framework. The various
agencies of federal, state and local government involved at the
Superfund site may also use the court-supervised process to re-
solve differences in a forum that a private dispute resolution
mechanism cannot provide.
The judicially supervised model does not contemplate that
all steps toward settlement will be taken in the courthouse. To
the contrary, significant and complex issues, such as the alloca-
tion of the defense group's share among its individual partici-
pants, may best be handled in a private intra-group forum such as
mediation or arbitration by experts of the group's choice.
When there has been initial agreement about the rules, pro-
cedures and goals of the settlement process, accompanied by the
affirmation of good faith participation, the obvious advantage of
judicial supervision becomes manifest. Judicial remedies, includ-
ing compulsion and sanction, are available to enforce the rules,
speed the process, share the costs, and address legitimate con-
cerns for fair and equitable conduct among participants, while
preserving due process rights.
The multi-party hazardous waste settlement process assigns
challenging and somewhat unfamiliar roles to attorneys, liaison
counsel, governmental agencies and the court itself. How well we
measure up to these challenges may determine what legacy of
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V. CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES
ABC CO., et al.,
Defendants.
Upon consideration of the views of all litigants appearing at a
Case Managment Conference before the undersigned on
date , the court concludes that a process for amicable
resolution of this multi-party hazardous waste case may be
conducted under judicial supervision among participating parties.
The issues to be negotiated include: [(a), (b), and (c)].
Accordingly, pursuant to Rules 16 and 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.;
IT IS this day of , hereby ORDERED as
follows:
1. Choice of Participation in Settlement Negotiations.
Not later than date , each party to this litigation shall
execute a form and return it to the Liaison Counsel for that party,
indicating whether the party chooses to participate in good faith
in settlement negotiations concerning the issues remaining in this
case [or such partial issues as to which the negotiations will be
limited]. The Choice of Participation Form to be utilized follows:
Check as appropriate and sign below:
- Yes, I wish to participate, in good
faith, in settlement negotiations to
resolve the issues remaining in this
case. I understand that by pledging to
negotiate in good faith I am not
bound to agree to any settlement or
allocated share, and that I may
withdraw my agreement to participate
in these settlement negotiations upon
written notice to all Liaison Counsel
prior to agreeing to any settlement.
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No, I choose not to participate in
settlement negotiations at this time






2. Selection of Settlement Liaison Counsel.
Not later than date , Liaison Counsel for each Group
shall convene a meeting of all group members who are partici-
pants in the settlement process. Each Group shall select its Set-
tlement Liaison Counsel, who may be the same attorney as the
Liaison Counsel or who may be different. The Group shall also
agree upon the powers and responsibilities of Settlement Liaison
Counsel, and the Group shall also agree upon an equitable reim-
bursement for the services of Settlement Liaison Counsel in this
regard. Settlement Liaison Counsel shall identify themselves to
the court and to each other Group not later than date
All Settlement Liaison Counsel shall thereafter attend a Settle-
ment Conference with the undersigned on date . Gener-
ally, such Settlement Conferences are open only to Settlement
Liaison Counsel until such future date when individual parties'
settlement negotiations are undertaken.
3. Joinder of Additional Parties.
The plaintiff is hereby granted leave to file an Amended
Complaint without the necessity of motion practice, joining addi-
tional parties, not later than date . The defendants,
through Liaison Counsel, are hereby granted leave to file a Third-
Party Complaint adding new parties not already joined in the
Complaint or Amended Complaint not later than date
To the extent feasible, this joinder shall be selective and limited
to new parties with a relatively higher degree of alleged responsi-
bility and continuing viability, and avoidingjoinder of parties with
a relatively lower degree of alleged responsibility or which are of
doubtful viability. Counsel are reminded that any such joinder
must be supported by reasonable basis in fact and in law as re-
quired by Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. Any defendant not wishing to
be identified as a third-party plaintiff in the new Third-Party Com-
plaint shall so indicate by filing an appropriate notice and serving
1991] 139
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same upon all Liaison Counsel within thirty (30) days after filing
of the new Third-Party Complaint. The Amended Complaint and
the new Third-Party Complaint shall be served upon the new par-
ties accompanied by the appropriate summons, copies of all
pleadings, and copies of all Case Management Orders (including
this Order) within thirty (30) days of filing the new pleading.
4. Form Interrogatories and Document Requests.
The plaintiff, or any other party which is the first party to file
a claim against a defendant or third-party defendant shall, within
thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, provide that party with a
statement of the complete present evidential basis for the inclu-
sion of that party by answering the Interrogatories and Document
Request attached as Set A. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of
this Set A discovery, the responding party shall provide the initiat-
ing party a statement of its complete presently known information
concerning issues of quantity and quality of material and the
nexus of that material to the Site, with respect to all material
which the responding party knows went to the Site or about which
the party has any reason to believe may have gone to the Site, and
shall include the factual basis for any denial of any element of the
information provided to it pursuant to the Set A responses above.
These statements shall be provided by answering the Interrogato-
ries and Document Production Requests attached in Set B. With
respect to obtaining information from parties which are not direct
defendants, the plaintiff may serve the Interrogatories and Docu-
ment Production Requests in the form attached as Set C which
shall be responsively answered within thirty (30) days of service.
Correspondingly, within thirty (30) days of receipt of Set C an-
swers and documents, plaintiff shall automatically serve reply in-
formation in the form of answers to Interrogatories attached as
Set D.
5. Insurance Discovery.
Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., each defendant
and third-party defendant shall, within sixty (60) days of the entry
of this Order, serve responsive answers and supply documents as
requested in the attached Interrogatories and Document Produc-
tion Requests Concerning Liability Insurance (Set E). Each party
shall certify and deliver its Set E answers and documents to Settle-
ment Liaison Counsel for the Group to which the party belongs.
Settlement Liaison Counsel shall keep these answers in the
Group's Documents Repository for inspection and copying by
other settlement participants. Settlement Liaison Counsel shall
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furnish the undersigned with the identification of a Group mem-
ber not timely providing this information.
6. Informal Discovery.
Participants shall be forthcoming with responses to reason-
able requests for informal discovery in addition to court-ordered
discovery above, including informal communications between re-
tained experts and consultants for purposes of settlement.
7. Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations.
All discussions and communications conducted by and
among participants as part of these court-supervised settlement
negotiations, also including discussions among consultants or ex-
perts retained by parties for this litigation, are confidential. The
contents of such discussions and communications shall remain
confidential and shall not be revealed to persons or parties not
within this settlement process, nor shall they be revealed to the
District Judge to whom this non-jury case is assigned.
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